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Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy: A
Background Study
LAURENCE M. HAUPTMANt
The decision is one of local, state, and national importance
alike...
If the claim of the plaintiffs had been substantiated, it would have
not only challenged the title of every purchaser and holder of land
included in the Ogden Land Company's purchase of August 31,
1826, but also the title to many millions of acres of lands in the
state held under similar treaties with the Indians.
2
INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 1974, the United States Supreme Court
overturned one hundred forty-three years of American law.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. County of
Oneida allowed this Indian nation access to federal courts
in the pursuit of its land claims.3 This landmark decision
held the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts (Non-
Intercourse Acts) applicable to the original thirteen states,
thereby providing access of the federal courts to the
Oneidas as well as to other Indians seeking their land
returned to them. No longer would jurisdictional barriers
obstruct their efforts. According to Justice Byron White's
opinion: "[the rudimentary propositions that Indian title is
a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with
federal consent apply in all of the States, including the
t Professor of History and SUNY Faculty Exchange Scholar, State University of
New York at New Paltz. The author would like to thank Professor Randy John
of Saint Bonaventure University and Dr. Christopher Densmore of State
University of New York at Buffalo for their assistance.
1. The Treaty Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1891.
2. Against the Senecas, CATrARAUGUS REPUBLICAN, May 8, 1891.
3. 414 U.S. 661 (1974). See generally GEORGE C. SHATTucK, THE ONEIDA
LAND CLAimS (1991).
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original 13." 4 Justice White reasoned the controversy arose
under the laws of the United States sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of federal courts and reversed the earlier
federal court determinations, remanding the case for
further proceedings to the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of New York.5
This United States Supreme Court decision challenged
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Harrison B. Christy [also
known as Christie], a historic 1891 New York Court of
Appeals case.6 More than one hundred years ago, the
Seneca Nation of Indians sought legal redress for the
fraudulent "takes" of their lands by the Ogden Land
Company in the 1820s.' This Article will trace the historical
background that inspired the Senecas to seek legal redress.
It will also discuss the convoluted reasoning of the Court of
Appeals when making its decision in 1891.
On August 31, 1826, a "treaty" was negotiated at the
Buffalo Creek Reservation between the Senecas and Robert
Troup, Thomas Ludlow Ogden and Benjamin Woolsey
Rogers, the trustees of the Ogden Land Company,
represented by their attorney John Gray. Nathaniel
Gorham was the representative of the State of
Massachusetts and Oliver Forward was the Commissioner
for the United States at the treaty grounds. In return for
$48,260, the Senecas "sold" the entire Caneadea
Reservation in Allegany County, the Big Tree, Canawaugus
and Squawky Hill Reservations in Livingston County, the
remaining lands of the Gardeau or "White Woman's"
Reservation in today's Wyoming and Livingston Counties,
36,638 acres of the Buffalo Creek Reservation in Erie
County, 33,409 acres of the Tonawanda Reservation in Erie
and Genesee Counties, and 5120 acres of the Cattaraugus
Reservation.8 The largely anti-Indian New York State
Legislature Committee of 1888, known as the Whipple
Committee, readily admitted in its 1889 report that, "[t]his
4. Id. at 670.
5. See id. at 675.
6. Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 2 N.Y.S. 546 (Sup. Ct. 1888), affd,
27 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1891), appeal dismissed, 162 U.S. 283 (1896).
7. See Interview with George C. Shattuck, Attorney, Oneida Indian Nations
of New York, in Syracuse, N.Y. (Aug. 25, 1983) (emphasizing the impacts of
Christy on subsequent Iroquois land claims).
8. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE INDIAN
PROBLEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 23 (1889) [hereinafter WHIPPLE REPORT].
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treaty was never ratified by the Senate of the United
States, or proclaimed by the President, and the Indians
have for a long time past claimed that the treaty was
invalid for this reason...."9
I. SENECA NATION OF INDIANS V. HARRISON B. CHRISTY:
BEGINNINGS, 1881-1889
On January 5, 1881, the Seneca Nation of Indians filed
a petition with the Bureau of Indian Affairs "praying that
they may be put into possession of certain lands in the
State of New York, accompanying which is copy [sic] of a
treaty entered into in 1826, between said Indian and Robert
Troup, Thomas L. Ogden, and Benjamin W. Rogers."' ° They
appealed for federal intervention in the case on the grounds
that this agreement was illegal because:
1st. No person or persons executing or siging [sic] the same was in
any manner authorized to act for or bind the Seneca Nation or the
people of the Seneca tribe of Indians. 2nd. The sale was not made
by or under the authority of the United States and has not been
ratified or confirmed or published by the President or Congress.
3rd. The sale was in violation of the laws and constitution of the
State of New York, and of the Statutes of the United States. 4th.
That the persons claiming title under the said pretended treaty
procured the signatures of those pretending to act for your
petitioners by paying them large bribes for their individual
benefit, and by promising and paying the more influential, life
annuities.... 5th. That the sum of $48,216 agreed to be paid to
your petitioners by said pretended treaty, has never been paid to
them. That a large part thereof was about that time deposited by
the said Robert Troup, Thomas L. Ogden, and Benjamin W.
Rogers, in the Ontario County Bank, subject to their own control,
where it remained until about the year 1853, when it was removed
without the knowledge or consent of the Seneca tribe or Nation;
and is now in the U.S. Treasury.
11
It took over a half-century for the Seneca Nation of
Indians to attempt legal action. This delay was in part
caused by the fraudulent Treaty of Buffalo Creek of 1838
9. Id.
10. Letter from Hiram Price, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the
Secretary of the Interior 1 (Apr. 15, 1891) (on file with the Seneca-Iroquois
National Museum, Seneca Nation of Indians, Allegany Indian Reservation,
Salamanca, N.Y.).
11. WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2.
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that not only led to the permanent loss of the Senecas'
Buffalo Creek Reservation but to the Seneca Revolution of
1848. The political upheaval overthrew the old chiefs'
system and replaced it with an elected system. The political
fallout from these changes created an unstable Seneca
polity leading into the late nineteenth century.
12
Besides delaying legal actions over the Treaty of 1826
and over their Kansas claims under the Treaty of Buffalo
Creek, the political chaos within the Seneca Nation allowed
outsiders to make questionable leasing arrangements with
individual Senecas. This situation gave rise to federal
legislation in 1875, 1880 and 1890 confirming these leases
for ninety-nine years, and creating the Seneca-Salamanca
lease controversy which was recently settled by
congressional legislation. 3 Thus, the Seneca Nation of
Indians did not have enough political stability to bring legal
action until the 1880s. This long delay had serious
implications in Seneca Nation of Indians v. Harrison B.
Christy.
The Senecas' appeal to the Interior Department in 1881
was largely ignored. In the meantime, the Seneca Nation of
Indians filed a legal action in the Supreme Court of New
York State in Erie County on October 13, 1885. The action
was to recover lands in the Town of Brant, known as the
"mile strip," that had been part of the Cattaraugus Indian
Reservation under the Treaty of Big Tree in 1797 until the
federal-Seneca treaty of 1826. This action of ejectment was
brought against Harrison B. Christy, who fifty years
previously secured one hundred acres of these lands from
the Ogden Land Company. 4 The Seneca Nation brought the
case under a New York State law of 1845 which gave the
Nation the right to prosecute and maintain any action, suit
or proceeding in all courts of law and equity."
James Clark Strong was the Senecas' attorney in the
case. Strong was a prominent lawyer and civic-minded
12. See generally, GEORGE H.J. ABRAMS, THE SENECA PEOPLE 61-83 (1976).
See also Thomas Abler, Factional Dispute and Party Conflict in the Political
System of the Seneca Nation: 1845-1895 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Toronto (Toronto)) (on file with the University of Toronto Library).
13. See generally Laurence M. Hauptman, Compensatory Justice: The
Seneca Nation Settlement Act, 71 NAT. FORUMi 31-33 (1991) (providing a
summary of the lease controversy).
14. See Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 2 N.Y.S. 546 (Sup. Ct. 1888),
affd, 27 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1891).
15. See Act of May 8, 1845, ch. 150, § 1, 1845 N.Y. Laws.
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resident of Buffalo. Born in Phelps, New York on May 26,
1826, Strong had lived in Washington Territory from 1847
to 1856. During the Civil War he rose to the rank of
lieutenant colonel in the Union army and was badly
wounded, which led to a permanent limp in his gait.
Breveted a general after the war, he joined the law practice
of his brother, John C. Strong in Buffalo. 6 Besides the
Senecas, James C. Strong represented the Cayuga Indians
in their claim against the State of New York and wrote
books about his earlier frontier and civil war experiences. 7
The Supreme Court gave judgment to Christy. The
Court insisted that the federal-Seneca treaty of 1826 was a
valid transaction, not in contravention of the Constitution
of the United States or of the federal Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1802."8 Section 12 of the 1802 act read:
And be it further enacted that no purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto, from any Indian,
or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United
States, shall be of any validity, in law or equity, unless the same
shall be made by treaty or convention, entered into pursuant to
the Constitution; and it shall be a misdemeanor in any person, not
employed under the authority of the United States, to negotiate
such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, to treat with any
such Indian nation or tribe of Indians, for the title or purchase of
any lands by them held or claimed, punishable by fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding
twelve months: Provided, nevertheless, that it shall be lawful for
the agent or agents of any state, who may be present at a treaty
held with Indians under the authority of the United States, in the
presence, and with the approbation of the commissioner or
commissioners of the United States, appointed to hold the same, to
propose to, and adjust with the Indians, the compensation to be
made, for their claims to lands within such state, which shall be
extinguished by treaty. 19
16. See generally JAMES CLARK STRONG, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JAMES
CLARK STRONG (1910).
17. See generally GEORGE WHITCOMB, BUFFALO CITY DIRECTORY 1153 (1891);
JAMES CLARK STRONG, WAH-KEE-NAH AND HER PEOPLE: THE CURIOUS CUSTOMS,
TRADITIONS, AND LEGENDS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (1893); MARK M.
BOATNER, CIVIL WAR DICTIONARY 156 (1959). See also NEW YORK LEGISLATURE,
REPORT OF THE COMItSSIONERS OF THE LAND OFFICE IN THE MATTER OF THE
CAYUGA INDIANS RESIDING IN CANADA, ASSEMBLY REPORT No. 165 (N.Y. 1849).
18. See Christy, 2 N.Y.S. at 547.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139
(1802) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)).
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The Senecas appealed the unfavorable decision to the
New York Court of Appeals." Seneca attorney Strong
argued that under the Constitution no valid purchase of
Indian lands could be made unless it was under and in
pursuance of a treaty between the United States and that
Indian nation. Strong argued that agreements were entered
into and executed under the treaty-making power conferred
on the President and Senate by that instrument and the
twelfth section of the federal Trade and Intercourse Act of
1802.1
The Court of Appeals rendered a unanimous decision in
April 1891 rejecting Strong's arguments.22 Justice Charles
Andrews, a Republican and former mayor of the city of
Syracuse, wrote the opinion for the court. Justice Andrews,
who was chief judge of the court in 1881 and 1882 and
again from 1893 to 1897, was one of the longest servingjurists on the state's highest court. In all, he served twenty-
seven years, retiring in 1897.23 Justice Andrews had no
intention of casting aspersions on the major state political
leaders of the past who had facilitated the "take" of Indian
lands.24 Moreover, at a time when Americans were re-
flecting on the closing of the frontier process and seeing the
Indians as a vanishing race, Justice Andrews was not
inclined to set a revolutionary precedent by finding justice
for the Senecas. He would hardly agree to add lands to the
Cattaraugus Reservation, an Indian landbase that was
being considered for allotment at precisely that time.
Justice Andrews saw the case through the eyes of a
white politician from central New York. His contact with
the Iroquois had been with the Onondagas, whose 6100 acre
reservation lay at the southern boundary of the city of
Syracuse. Much like the Senecas, the Onondagas faced
increasing pressures for allotment. In fact, the pressures on
the Iroquois reached their zenith in the last two decades of
the nineteenth century. In 1889, the Whipple Committee's
20. See Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy, 27 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1891).
21. See Christy, 27 N.E. at 280.
22. See id. at 282.
23. See FRANCIS BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS,
1847-1932, at 114 (1985); NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, THERE SHALL BE A
COURT OF APPEALS: 150TH ANNiVERSARY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 96-97 (1997).
24. See Christy, 27 N.E. at 279.
25. See WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8, at 75, 78-79.
952 [Vol. 46
SENECA NATION OF INDIANS
report concluded that the "Indian problem" could be solved
only by ending the Indians' separate status, giving them
full citizenship and absorbing them "into the great mass of
the American people... ."2 The report, which cited the
testimony of disgruntled Onondaga political leaders as well
as the testimony and earlier studies conducted by Dr. C.M.
Sims, Chancellor of Syracuse University, described in its
culturally myopic way the conditions on each New York
reservation! Without question, the report had its harshest
words for the Onondagas since both missionaries and state
officials were frustrated in dealing with their conservatism
and resistance to change. With no understanding of cultural
relativism, the report condemned the traditional leadership
on the reservation, characterized the religious practices as
depraved, immoral and superstitious and described the
social and industrial state as "chronic barbarism."28 It
insisted, "[t]heir present condition is infamously vile and
detestable, and just so long as they are permitted to remain
in this condition, just so long there will remain upon the
fair name of the Empire State a stain of no small
magnitude."29
The Whipple Committee's report maintained that
reservation lands be allotted in severalty among tribal
members with suitable restrictions as to alienation of
whites and protection from judgments and debts. It urged
the extension of state laws and jurisdiction over the Indians
and "their absorption into citizenship."0 Finally, the report
concluded:
These Indian people have been kept as "wards" or children long
enough. They should now be educated to be men, not Indians, and
it is the earnest belief of the committee that when.., the Indians
of the State are absorbed into the great mass of the American
people, then, and not before, will the "Indian problem" be solved.
3 1
These attitudes were not exclusively reflected by the state
policymakers of the time. American Indians in the second
half of the nineteenth century were faced with a prevailing
white societal attitude that sought to absorb native peoples
26. Id. at 79.
27. See id. at 41-79.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 45.
31. Id. at 79.
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into American society through a four-pronged formula of
forced assimilation. This so-called Americanization process
included: (1) the Christianizing activities of missionaries on
reservations in order to stamp out "paganism"; (2) the
exposure of the Indian to white Americans' ways through
compulsory education and boarding schools such as
Carlisle, Hampton and Lincoln institutes; (3) the break-up
of tribal lands and allotment to individual Indians to instill
personal initiative, allegedly required by the free enterprise
system; and, (4) in return for accepting land in severaltyr,
the "rewarding" of Indians with United States citizenship.'
This process was advocated by prominent reform groups
such as the Indians Rights Association, the Women's
National Indian Association, the Lake Mohonk Conferences
of Friends of the Indian and the United States Board of
Indian Commissioners. Exhibiting a Social Darwinism bias
and advocating a similar paternalistic approach, these
reformers believed that responsible men of affairs owed an
obligation to what they considered "weaker races."" Behind
these attitudes was the seldom-challenged assumption that
it was possible to "kill" the Indian but "save" the man. 4
Most of the five thousand reservations Indians in New
York in 1890 did not share the reformers' views. Most
believed that it was not worth saving the man at the
expense of killing the Indian. They rejected
Americanization and chose to preserve tribal identity by
retaining their separate existence, speaking in their own
languages, performing their ceremonies, continuing to
observe their native religion, not pushing for suffrage and
viewing themselves as citizens of sovereign enclave nation-
states. In short, many Indians, although not all, were in
opposition to each and every item in the reformers'
Americanization blueprint. 6
Justice Andrews' Indian neighbors in central New York,
the Onondagas, were among the most resistant to this
32. See Laurence M. Hauptman, Governor Theodore Roosevelt and the
Indians of New York State, 119 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC. 1-
2 (1975).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 2.
35. See id.
36. See Laurence M. Hauptman, Secnecas & Subdividers: The Resistance to
Allotment of Indian Lands in New York, 1887-1906, in 9 PROLOGUE: THE
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 105-07, 114-16 (1977).
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Americanization formula. The Longhouse at Onondaga
attracted the largest number of followers, and the
Onondaga chiefs, who constituted the governing council of
the reservation, continued to adhere to the Longhouse
religion." Although there were frequent calls from a small
group of converted Christian Onondagas, who wanted this
hereditary system abolished and replaced with an elected
one, such change was not forthcoming. Out of 494
reservation residents (including eighty-six Oneidas) in
1890, there were only twenty-three professed Methodists,
twenty-one Wesleyans and twenty-four Episcopalians 3
Despite the frequent visits of Episcopal, Methodist,
Presbyterian and Quaker missionaries and the building of a
Methodist and an Episcopal Church as well as an Episcopal
school in the nineteenth century, a minority of Onondagas
were converted.39 New York State's educational thrust,
largely geared to assimilating Indians, was met with
substantive resistance. In one school report for 1888, the
superintendent observed revealingly, "[w]ith so much done
for them, why should not the Indians be happy and
prosperous?"4 He then went on to answer his own question,
blaming what he claimed as the lack of advancement on
Indian "race customs," "practical communism" of the
Indians and the Onondaga chiefs' alleged authoritarian
rule.
41
In this assimilationist-inspired setting, it is hardly
surprising that Justice Andrews rendered the decision that
he did. Justice Andrews insisted,
These claims challenge the title not only of every purchaser and
holder of lands within the boundaries of the grant of August 31,
1826, but all the title to many millions of acres in this state, held
under Indian treaties made by the state of New York with the
Indian tribes within its borders or under grants made by Indians
to individuals under the authority of the state, where no treaty had
been made between the United States and Indian occupants.
[emphasis added]
4 2
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. NEW YoRx STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 34TH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT 763 (1888).
41. Id.
42. Christy, 27 N.E. at 278.
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Justice Andrews readily admitted improprieties. He
pointed out that New York State's treaties "were generally
negotiated by the legislature, acting in conjunction with the
governor of the state. It appears that on two or three
occasions a commissioner of the United States was present
when treaties were made."" The justice then tried to
explain why so many eminent New Yorkers in the past had
violated federal Indian laws:
The treaties were in no sense treaties made by the President and
Senate of the United States. The list of governors, who
participated in making them, embraces many of the great names
in the history of the state. It includes the Clintons, Tompkins, Van
Buren, Marcy, Wright, Seward. By virtue of these treaties this
state entered upon the lands acquired thereby, and they have been
sold and built upon and improved, and comprise some of the
fairest and most prosperous districts of the state. It is evident that
the eminent statesmen who participated in these negotiations, did
not understand that the prohibition in the Federal Constitution
that "no state shall entered into any treaty, alliance or
confederation" (Art. 1, sec. 10), or the other provision vesting the
treaty-making power in the president and senate (Art. 2, sec. 2,
subd. 2), prevented the state from negotiating with the Indian
tribes therein for the extinguishment of the Indian title. It is
worthy of observation that the Articles of Confederation also
vested in Congress the exclusive power of entering into treaties
and alliances (Art. IX). The United States under the Articles of
Confederation and afterwards under the Federal Constitution,
assumed the position of protector of the Indian tribes. 
44
Despite his obvious qualms over state actions, Justice
Andrews insisted the Ogdens' purchase of Seneca lands in
1826 was valid since it was done in the presence of and with
the approval of commissioners both of Massachusetts and
New York pursuant to the 1786 New York State-
Massachusetts compact. To Andrews, the deed executed in
1826 was made valid also by voluntary surrender and
abandonment by the Indian occupants of the land making
the ratification of the federal treaty between the United
States and the Senecas unnecessary.
Justice Andrews was referring to the federally ratified
accord between New York State and Massachusetts at
43. Id. at 279.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 281-82.
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Hartford, Connecticut of 1786 that had settled their
existing dispute over western lands. The two states drew a
"9preemption line" north from the Pennsylvania border
through Seneca Lake to Sodus Bay. Massachusetts received
the preemptive right to lands west of Seneca Lake and ten
townships lying along the Susquehanna and Tioughnioga
Rivers. New York State won title and political sovereignty
over the entire disputed area. Subsequently, Massachusetts
officials sold off their preemptive right to a huge six million
acre parcel to Oliver Phelps and Nathaniel Gorham, two of
the leading land speculators of the early Republic and the
very same Gorham who was Massachusetts commissioner
at the 1826 "treaty." In the second section of the 1786
accord:
Massachusetts ceded to the state of New York the right of
government, sovereignty and jurisdiction over the whole territory
in dispute, and New York ceded to Massachusetts the right of pre-
emption of the soil and to extinguish the Indian title to about
6,000,000 acres of land in the western part of the State of New
York, described in the treaty, Massachusetts surrendering to New
York all claim to any other territory therein.
46
Justice Andrews added that the clause in the Federal
Constitution prohibiting the states from entering into
treaties, did not preclude a state having the right of dealing
with the Indian tribes directly, for the extinguishment of
the Indian title. 7 To Justice Andrews, the "true spirit and
intent" of the 1802 federal Trade and Intercourse Act was to
allow a state or its agents to enter into treaties or other
agreements with Indian tribes within its borders:
[P]rovided it was entered into in the presence of and with the
46. Id. at 276-77. Under the Tenth Article of the Hartford Convention:
The commonwealth of Massachusetts may grant the right of pre-
emption of the whole or any part of the said lands and territories to
any person or persons, who by virtue of such grant, shall have good
right to extinguish by purchase the claims of the native Indians,
providing, however, that no purchase from the native Indians by any
such grantees shall be valid, unless the same shall be made in the
presence of and approved by a superintendent to be appointed for such
purpose by the commonwealth of Massachusetts, and having no
interest in such purchase, and unless such purchase shall be confirmed
by the commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Id. at 277.
47. Id. at 281.
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approval of a commissioner of the United States appointed to
attend the same, and that such a treaty is, within the true
meaning of the proviso, a treaty held under the authority of the
United States, and required no ratification or proclamation by the
federal authorities.
4 8
Furthermore, Justice Andrews concluded the Senecas'
sale of the land was subsequently confirmed by an act of
Congress in 1846, which authorized the President of the
United States to receive from the Ontario Bank money and
securities representing the purchase price of the lands.49
These moneys were deposited in the Treasury of the United
States in 1855. Despite its retroactive nature, Justice
Andrews insisted that the act of receiving these moneys
under federal statute and its administration as a trust fund
for the benefit of the Senecas, "furnishes the most emphatic
evidence of a ratification .... 50
Five years later, the case, on a writ of error, reached the
United States Supreme Court. In a brief opinion of the case
decided 7-0 on April 18, 1896, Chief Justice Fuller
dismissed the writ of error finding the federal courts did not
have jurisdiction because the New York Court of Appeals
decision was decided "upon a distinct and independent
ground, not involving a Federal question... ." Unlike the
Warren court in 1974, the United States Supreme Court in
1896 held there was no constitutional issue because
violations of the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts did not
give Indians standing. The Court's defense of the Ogden
Land Company's acquisition of lands of the Seneca Nation
at the Cattaraugus Indian Reservation in 1826 appears
egregious when judged in the context of Seneca history from
1797 to 1828.
Although Christy focused on the lands that the Ogden
Land Company had acquired from the Cattaraugus Indian
Reservation, the prime objective of their dealings from 1810
to 1828 was the Seneca lands in the Genesee Valley. This
was a vast empire of rich agricultural lands highly coveted
after the building of New York State's transportation
system. The Ogdens' lust for these lands as well as the rest
of the Seneca estate and the Seneca resistance to these
48. Id. at 281.
49. See id. at 282.
50. Id.
51. Christy, 162 U.S. at 289.
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forces defined the Indian history of western New York State
in the early decades of the nineteenth century.
A. Genesee Fever
The Genesee Country was recognized as Seneca under
Article III of the Pickering Treaty of 1794 and specifically
reserved for these Indians under the Treaty of Big Tree of
1797.52 These lands were substantial, containing some of
the richest farm lands in New York State: (1) Canawaugus;
(2) Little Beard's Town; (3) Big Tree; (4) Squawky Hill; (5)
Gardeau or White Woman's Reservation; and (6) Caneadea.
The one square mile Oil Spring Reservation near Cuba,
New York, in both Allegany and Cattaraugus Counties,
appears to have been inadvertently left out during the
Treaty of Big Tree negotiations." From the signing of the
Treaty of Big Tree, there were attempts to rid the Genesee
region of its Indian population. Joseph Ellicott, the chief
agent for the Holland Land Company who surveyed the
Seneca reservation boundaries in 1798, predicted the
Genesee Valley would be rapidly settled by non-Indians if
transportation could be improved. He wrote to the directors
of the Holland Land Company, "[ilt is something to know
that the Genesee River which is called and generally
supposed to be a fine navigable stream, is like many others
navigable in theory and conjecture only."54 In a treaty of
June 30, 1802, the Senecas sold the two square mile parcel
of the Little Beard's Town to Oliver Phelps. With a federal
Indian commissioner, John Tayler, the present agreement
was ratified by the United States Senate in 1803. Among
the signatories were Cornplanter, Red Jacket, Young King
and Captain Pollard.55 In order to make the region more
attractive to white settlement, the Holland Land Company
and the Ogden Land Company promoted road-building
52. See The Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44 (Nov. 11,
1794); Contract between Robert Morris and the Seneka [sic] Nation, Sept. 15,
1797, 7 Stat. 601 (Sept. 15, 1797).
53. See The Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44; HOLLAND
LAND COMPANY'S PAPERS: REPORTS OF JOSEPH ELLICOTT I, at 51, 87-89 (Robert
W. Bingham ed., 1937) [hereinafter HOLLAND LAND COMPANY'S PAPERS]. See also
Contract betveen Robert Morris and the Seneka [sic] Nation, Sept. 15, 1797, 7
Stat. 601. See generally EDWARD DOTY, HISTORY OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY, NEW
YORK 60-103 (1876).
54. HOLLAND LAND COMPANY'S PAPERS, supra note 53, at 66.
55. See 7 Stat. 72 (June 30, 1802).
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projects in the region. Ridge Road was improved and the
Genesee Turnpike was built in stages from the 1790s to
1813.56 Other roads followed, laid out largely as a result of
Ellicott's efforts. Ellicott concentrated his attention on
building two major routes running from the Genesee River
to Buffalo. The first was the Middle Road or Big Tree Road,
which ran from Big Tree (Geneseo) to Lake Erie just south
of the Buffalo Creek Reservation. The second was the
Buffalo Road, a section of the Genesee Turnpike between
Batavia and Buffalo."
In the first years of the 1800s, Ellicott also initiated
smaller projects such as the Oak Orchard Road from
Batavia to Lake Ontario, where he planned a trading post.
He also connected the Big Tree Road with an already
existing road built by Genesee land speculator Charles
Williamson that connected southeastward to Bath and
Painted Post. These efforts were followed by the Holland
Land Company's subsidies of roads or road improvement
along the entire New York State Lake Erie frontier south of
Buffalo, as well as Adam Hoops' efforts to extend roads in
the southern Genesee region to connect with the Allegany
River at Olean.
Long before his appointment in 1810 to the New York
State Board of Canal Commissioners, Ellicott also pushed
canals as a way of making western New York attractive to
non-Indian settlement. His survey maps and fieldbooks
were employed in the first decade of the nineteenth century
to determine the feasibility of developing the connection
between the Genesee River and Lake Erie. He also
promoted the possibilities of navigation along the
Tonawanda Creek, Tonawanda Swamp and through the
Tonawanda Valley as a whole. A hard-driven, determined
fellow, Ellicott successfully battled with General Peter B.
Porter over the site of the western terminus of the Erie
Canal-Ellicott favored Buffalo (New Amsterdam) and
Porter favored Black Rock. At other times, he came in direct
conflict with his employer, Paul Busti, the Chief Agent of
the Holland Land Company, over his elaborate and
expensive efforts to promote roads and canals or sell
56. See WILLIAM CHAZANOF, JOSEPH ELLICOTT AND THE HOLLAND LAND
COMPANY 80-83 (1970); PAUL D. EvANs, THE HOLLAND LAND COMPANY 275-87
(1924) (discussing policies related to expenditures for development purposes).
57. See CHAZANOF, supra note 56, at 157-80; EvANs, supra note 56, at 287-
89.
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Holland, Land Company property off to the state.
Consequently, Ellicott must be considered the chief
architect of the state's early development in the lands from
the Genesee River to Lake Erie. Without his surveys,
fieldbooks, town-site development projects and, most
importantly, his promotion of the regional transportation
network, New York would not have emerged as the empire
state as rapidly.
A major obstacle for non-Indian development in the
Genesee was the existence of nearly 100,000 acres of Seneca
Indian lands in the region in 1797. Peace with Great
Britain in 1815 and the renewed push for canal
development in western New York created new pressures
for the Seneca Indians living in Genesee Country. Although
Little Beard's Town was lost in 1802, the Senecas did resist
other efforts to dispose of their lands. As early as 1813, they
had rejected all attempts to consolidate their populations
onto the Allegany Indian Reservation. However, they now
faced a more determined foe, David A. Ogden, who had
purchased the preemption rights to the Seneca
reservations."8
B. The Ogden Land Company
In a September 1810 deed the Holland Land Company
conveyed preemptive rights to the Cattaraugus, Buffalo
Creek, Allegany, Tonawanda, Caneadea and Tuscarora
Reservations. This was more than 196,000 acres, for fifty
cents an acre, with "all the estate, right, title, interest,
property, claim and demand whatsoever" of the first
parties, "subject only to the right of the native Indian and
not otherwise." " The deed contained a covenant stating,
they, the said parties of the first part are seized of an indefensible
estate or inheritance of and in the above mentioned and described
premises, and are lawfully authorized to sell the preemption right
of, in and to the several tracts, pieces or parcels of land above
58. See Conable, A Steady Enemy: The Ogden Land Company and the
Seneca Indians (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester)
(on fie with the University of Rochester Library) (analyzing David Ogden's
efforts to take possession of the Seneca lands).
59. Id.
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mentioned and described.60
David A. Ogden, a former Federalist congressman and
Holland Land attorney, created a "trust with twenty equal
shares.""' Ogden held title to the land when obtained from
the Senecas and "would receive 10 per cent of the proceeds
from all sales." 2 The shareholders included other members
of the Ogden family, David Ogden, Thomas L. Ogden,
Charles Le Roux Ogden and Abraham Ogden, along with
Thomas and Aaron Cooper and Joshua Waddington. 3
On February 8, 1821, David A. Ogden transferred his
preemptive right to Robert Troup, Thomas Ludlow Ogden
and Benjamin W. Rogers as trustees. This trust officially
became known as the Ogden Land Company on February 8,
1821.' On December 19, 1829 Robert Troup, Thomas L.
Ogden, and Benjamin W. Rogers, as the Ogden Land
Company trustees, conveyed their interests to Thomas L.
Ogden, Charles G. Troup and Joseph Fellows. Right
through the early 1840s, these individuals sought to rid
New York State of its Indian populations. 5 The Ogden Land
Company was especially interested in expanding its
holdings in two areas. It knew that the emerging
metropolitan giant, Buffalo, needed lands to the east to
expand, namely lands held at the Buffalo Creek
Reservation. The Land Company also recognized the
potential of the Senecas' Genesee River lands. Growing
Indian dependence, the pressures the canal created for the
Seneca Indians and increased white leasing of Seneca lands
strengthened the position of the Ogden Land Company. As
legal holders of the preemption rights to all of Seneca lands,
the company's profits depended on getting the Indians to
sell their lands to the company. Consequently, on the
company's payroll from 1811 onward was met through
actions of Horatio Jones, the white captive and Seneca
adoptee who "aided" in the negotiations of most of the
60. WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8, at 138.
61. Conable, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 53.
64. See WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8, at 172-83.
65. See id. at 183-89; Conable, supra note 58, at 1-2. See also Henry S.
Manley, Buying Buffalo from the Indians, 28 N.Y. HIST. 313 (1947). See
generally, SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, THE CASE OF THE SENECA INDIANS (photo reprint
1979) (1840).
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swindles of Seneca lands (including Grand Island) from the
1790s to 1826.66 Jellis Clute, who lived at Mary Jemison's
Gardeau Reservation, also worked for the company and
"facilitated" the transfer of the lands of the 'White Woman"
to the Ogdens between 1817 and 1826.
By 1821, the three most powerful voices and active
players in securing Seneca lands were Troup, James S.
Wadsworth and Peter B. Porter. Wadsworth was the largest
land speculator in Livingston County and the son of the
founder of Geneseo. As a state commissioner, Porter had
negotiated the New York State-Seneca "treaty" of 1815 that
"acquired" Grand Island and other islands in the Niagara
River. These three men conspired with the Ogdens to secure
the Senecas' Genesee lands and subdue "the opposition of
Red Jacket."67 Troup, one of the nation's leading attorneys,
not only represented the Ogdens but was an agent for the
Pulteney Estate as well. By the mid-1820s, he was also a
promoter of land speculation in Indian lands in Georgia and
lobbied for new roads to open up his holdings in Allegany
and Steuben Counties in order to connect with the Erie
Canal sixty miles away.68 Even though Porter had
withdrawn from company operations by the mid-1820s, as a
hero of the War of 1812, Porter was active in helping the
Ogdens secure Seneca lands at the "Treaty" of 1826.9 Later,
Augustus wrote to him about the economic opportunities
provided by acquisition of Squawky Hill, Big Tree and
Canawaugus Reservations. The surveyor-land speculator
described half of these lands by the company as "the finest
quality of cleared, high-cultivated Genesee flats," property
that could draw a resale price of $100 per acre.?O It should
66. See Conable, supra note 58, at 27, 73-74; LAURENCE HAUPTMAN,
CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK
STATE (forthcoming Feb. 1999) (developing the connections among land
speculation, transportation interests, national security concerns, and the
interlocking conflicts of interest at every turn).
67. Letter from Peter B. Porter to T.L. Ogden (June 14, 1823) microformed
MSS, MR 4 (Buffalo Erie County Historical Society).
68. See Letter from Robert Troup to John Greig (March 16, 1826)
(Skivington Collection on file with the University of Rochester); Letter from
Masterton Ure to Robert Troup (Aug. 4, 1825) (on file with the New York Public
Library).
69. See generally, Henry S. Manley, Red Jacket's Last Campaign, 31 N.Y.
HIST. 149 (1950).
70. Letter from Augustus Porter to Peter B. Porter 2 (Sept. 29, 1826)
microformed MSS., MR 4 (Buffalo Erie County Historical Society).
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be noted that the Senecas ultimately received
approximately $.50 an acre for this "sale."7'
When the Senecas rejected company and state urgings
to sell their lands and move west with the Oneidas and
their missionary Eleazar Williams, the Ogden Land
Company and its agents intensified its efforts to secure
Seneca lands. They took advantage of the growing divisions
within the Seneca world after the War of 1812. Although
the Senecas had a collective estate and a valued position as
the protector of the Iroquois Confederacy after the
Revolution, the Senecas' individual needs conflicted at
times with their national interests. Each reservation had a
set of chiefs whose political base depended on their abilities
to keep the land companies at bay, but who were sometimes
susceptible to outright bribery through annuity payments."
As a result of land and population pressures, increased
social disintegration caused by alcohol and economic
dependence on the white world for survival, local chiefs
could be manipulated or enticed by outside forces. 3 Fears of
removal, a policy presented to them as "inevitable" at
nearly every council and an increase of acculturated forces
such as missionaries collectively contributed to land
companies' leverage in certain Seneca communities after
the War of 1812. In addition, powerful leaders, such as
Young King and Pollard, were willing to make deals with
the devil, the Ogden Land Company, to fight their Seneca
enemy Red Jacket.
The Buffalo Creek Reservation had more power and
influence in the Seneca polity because it was a ritual center.
From the 1780s to the 1840s the Iroquois Confederacy met
at the Buffalo Creek Reservation. To most Senecas during
this period, the retention of Buffalo Creek had greatest
priority.75 If and when the Senecas were pressured to cede
some of their lands, Buffalo Creek would have to be
maintained at all costs. Hence, the Seneca's collective
estate had individualistic pulls that worked against the
national interest of the Senecas as a whole. The strategy of
71. This figure is based upon my calculations under the "Treaty" of 1826:
land "sold" divided by "payment" to the Senecas.
72. For a portrait of Seneca existence, see GEORGE H.J. ABRAM, THE SENECA
PEOPLE (1976); Abler, supra note 12.
73. Abler, supra note 12.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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the Ogden Land Company was to manipulate these
individualistic interests.
By the mid 1820s, through the efforts of Horatio Jones
and James Clute, the company began making "gifts" to
certain chiefs. Seneca leaders were enticed by $80 to $120
payments to their sell lands."6 By the summer of 1825, T.L.
Ogden convinced the War Department to hold a treaty
negotiation with the Senecas and appointed Oliver
Forward, a leading merchant and harbor promoter of
Buffalo, to cooperate with the Ogden Company.
Before the "treaty" of 1826, the Seneca lands at
Gardeau, not the other Seneca reservations, were reduced
in size. Gardeau or Gardow (Ga-da-oh or Kau-tau meaning
"down and up," valley and hillside or bluff), the White
Woman's Reservation, was occupied by Mary Jemison and
forty-eight Senecas." Jemison was the famous girl captive,
the "white woman of the Genesee.""9 At the urging of two
enterprising white men, Micah Brooks and Thomas Clute,
the New York State Legislature passed a private bill on
April 19, 1817 making Jemison a citizen of New York State
and "confirmed" her title to the Gardeau Reservation."
Brooks, a congressman, was one of the founders of
Livingston County and one of the earliest promoters of New
York State's canal system. Thomas Clute was the brother of
Jellis Clute, one of the main operatives of the Ogden Land
Company.
On April 23, 1817, in return for $3000 and a mortgage
to secure $4286, the aged Jemison executed a deed of 7000
acres on the east side of the reservation to Micah Brooks
and Jellis Clute.8' Because of her advanced age and her
inability to manage her property Mary Jemison agreed to
hire Thomas Clute as her guardian. In payment for his
services, Jemison gave Thomas Clute a great deal of land
on the west side of the Gardeau Reservation.
76. See id.
77. See Conable, supra note 58, at 82.
78. See DOTY, supra note 53, at 61.
79. See JAMES E. SEAVER, A NARRATvE OF THE LIFE OF MRS. MARY JEMISON
(Syracuse University Press 1990); JAMES E. SEAVER, A NARRATiVE OF THE LIFE
OF MRS. MARY JEMISON 33 (University of Oklahoma Press 1992).
80. See SEAVER, supra note 79, at 119-24 (1990).
81. See RONALD SHAw, ERIE WATER WEST 67, 400 (1966); NOBEL E.
WHITFORD, HISTORY OF THE CANAL SYSTEM I, at 65; LOCKWOOD DOTY, HISTORY OF
THE GENESEE COUNTRY 597-98 (1925) (describing Micah Brooks' life).
82. See SEAVER, supra note 79.
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On August 24, 1817, Mary Jemison leased all of the
remaining Gardeau Reservation, except for 4000 acres and
Thomas Clute's lot, to Micah Brooks and Jellis Clute.83
Jemison's words are revealing about this transaction:
Finding their [Brooks and Clutel title still incomplete, on account
of the United States government and Seneca Chiefs not having
sanctioned my acts, they [Brooks and Clute] solicited me to renew
the contract, and have the conveyance made to them in such a
manner as that they should thereby be constituted sole proprietors
of the soil. 84
By the winter of 1822-1823, Mary Jemison agreed to sell
Brooks and Jellis Clute the Gardeau lands they desired,
except for a tract "two miles long, and one mile wide, lying
on the [Genesee] river where I should choose it; and also
reserving Thomas Clute's lot. 85
On September 3, 1823, at Moscow, New York in
Livingston County, with Major Charles Carroll, a federal
commissioner, Mary Jemison ceded all but two square miles
(1280 acres) to John Greig and Henry B. Gibson. 6 Greig
and Gibson obtained all of the Gardeau Reservation except
the reserved two square miles, then in Genesee County and
now in Wyoming County near Castile, New York, for $4286,
less than $.30 per acre. Greig, a Scottish-born attorney from
Canandaigua, was in the employ of the Ogden Land
Company. Greig was, very much like Troup, amassing a
fortune as a result of representing the land companies.
Before serving the Ogdens, his firm, Howell & Greig,
represented Thomas Morris, the Phelps-Gorham land
company and the Pulteney Estate. He was also a major
canal promoter and urban developer of Rochester, owning
significant real estate in the city.8 By the time of his death
83. SEAVER, supra note 79, at 122. See also LocKWOOD DOTY, HISTORY OF
LIVINGSTON COUNTY, NEW YORK FROM ITS EARLY TRADITIONS TO THE PRESENT,
TOGETHER WITH EARLY TOWN SKETcHES Vol. II (1905).
84. SEAVER, supra note 79, at 122.
85. Id. See also LOCKWOOD DOTY, HISTORY OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY, NEW
YORK FROM ITS EARLY TRADITIONS TO THE PRESENT, TOGETHER WITH EARLY TOWN
SKETcHES (1905).
86. SEAVER, supra note 79, at 123; DOTY, supra note 53, at app. IV, VI.
87. See Letter from Thomas Morris to John Greig (Oct. 2, 1805); Letter from
Archibald Kane to John Greig (Jan. 15, 1807); Letter from Joseph Ely to John
Greig (Oct. 26, 1807); Howell & John Greig to Henry Remsen (Nov. 25, 1808);
Letter from John Greig to Ebenezer Wood (Mar. 17, 1821) (Skivington
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in the 1850s, he had vast holdings, totaling over thirty
thousand acres, predominantly located in the Genesee
Valley.
Among his clients and partners were Thomas Morris,
the Phelps and Gorham, the Pulteney Estates and the
Ogden Land Company. Gibson, associated with Brooks and
Jellis Clute, agreed to pay Jemison and her heirs and
successors $300 a year forever. Previously, in November
1818, Thomas Morris, Robert Morris' son involved with the
Treaty of Big Tree in 1797, conveyed to Greig the
preemptive right to 9769 acres of Gardeau. Five years later,
in June 1823, Joseph Higbee, a trustee for one of Robert
Morris' creditors, conveyed to Brooks and Jellis Clute 3000
acres of Gardeau for $3800.
This land cession, as well as others involving the
Gardeau Reservation, was never submitted to or ratified by
the United States Senate. In attendance at the treaty
grounds in 1823 were United States Commissioner Carroll,
Indian Agent Jasper Parrish and Interpreter Horatio Jones.
According to Mary Jemison, Nathaniel Gorham, the leading
New York land speculator, and Judge Howell "acted in
concert with Maj. Carrol" and "upwards of twenty chiefs"
signed this "treaty."88 As early as 1799, Horatio Jones had
been involved in land schemes in the Genesee Valley with
Thomas Morris and Oliver Phelps, Gorham's business
partner. Parrish was collaborating with General Peter B.
Porter, the New York State Indian Commissioner and a
Collection on file with the University of Rochester). See also Greig-Morris
connection (Skivington Collection on file with the University of Rochester);
Letter from Joseph Fellows to Greig (June 6, 1836) (delineating Greig's
connections to canals and to the Ogden agenda); Letter from Humphrey
Howland to John Greig (Sept. 13, 1836); Letter from T.L. Ogden to John Greig
(Feb. 15, 1836); Letter from John Greig to James Stryker (Jan. 25, 1833); Letter
from L.R. Lyon to John Greig (Oct. 12, 1836) (Skivington Collection on file with
the University of Rochester); Letter from Joseph Fellows to John Greig (May 1,
1837); Memorial of John Greig (Nov. 1837-Dec. 1, 1837) (Skivington Collection
on file with the University of Rochester); Abstract of Real Estate (Jan. 1, 1850)
(Skivington Collection on file with the University of Rochester) (detailing
Greig's vast fortune); Property and Estate of John Greig (Skivington Collection
on file with the University of Rochester); LocKwoOD DOTY, HISTORY OF GENESEE
COUNTRY (1925) (portraying John Greig).
88. See Letter from Oliver L. Phelps to John Henry (Sept. 3, 1799)
(Skivington Collection on file with the University of Rochester); FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDiAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITIcAL ANOMALY 144-
45 (1994); 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, LAW AND TREATIES 1033-34 (1904) (describing
the document as an "unratified" treaty).
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major investor in the Ogden Land Company at the time.
Parrish was "rewarded" with Squaw Island in the Niagara
River after the so-called "Seneca-New York State Treaty of
1815" in which the empire state allegedly acquired Grand
Island. 9
On February 17, 1824, Secretary of War John C.
Calhoun, soon to be elected Vice President of the United
States, wrote to sub-agent Jasper Parrish of the Six Nations
Agency. He told him that the "treaty" between John Greig,
Henry Gibson and the Seneca Indians with regards to the
Gardeau Reservation did not need formal United States
Senate approval. He reasoned that since it was "considered
in the nature of a private contract [it] does not acquire the
special ratification of the Government as in treaties
between the Indians and the United States."" Calhoun
further added, "[c]onsequently there is nothing to prevent
its execution by the parties concerned, as soon as they may
think it proper."" Later, on February 16, 1827, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote the Secretary of War
indicating that the "treaty" of September 23, 1823 did not
need Senate approval since it "was esteemed to be a useless
ceremony; the President approving it only."92
By 1825, both- Gibson and Greig had developed their
plans for pursuing the remaining Seneca lands in the
Genesee Valley. Working closely with the Clutes as well as
Jasper Parrish, they pushed for new treaty negotiations.
Until the Fall of 1825, these negotiations remained on hold
since the newly-elected Adams administration had other
priorities and the Indians themselves wanted to learn more
about the new "Great Father" in Washington.93
II. THE TREATY OF 1826
The push for a new Seneca treaty entailing much of the
tribal landbase gained impetus in the late Winter of 1826.
On March 10, 1826, Congressman Garnsey of New York
offered a resolution "proposing to instruct the Committee on
89. 1816 N.Y. Laws 65-66 (describing Parrish's "reward").
90. Letter from John C. Calhoun to Jasper Parrish (Feb. 17, 1824)
(Skivington Collection on file with the University of Rochester).
91. Id.
92. 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 868 (1827).
93. Letter from Henry Gibson to John Greig (Skivington Collection on file
with the University of Rochester).
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Indian Affairs to inquire into the expediency of making an
appropriation for holding a treaty with the Indians west of
the Genesee River, in the State of New York."94 On March
10 and 11, the House of Representatives debated the merits
and need to hold a Seneca treaty, but the discussion
centered mostly on states' rights issues and whether states
had jurisdiction over the Indians. Congressmen from New
York, Georgia and Connecticut dominated the debate. They
discussed a variety of issues including: whether there was a
need at all to appoint a special federal commissioner to
treat with the Indians, the strange history of the
preemption right to Indian lands in New York, and Albany's
position on the matter.95 One congressman predicted that
"whenever your Agent shall go there and propose such a
sale, Red Jacket will be ready to meet him, and will drive
him from his purpose by arguments which he will find it in
vain to resist."96 The same congressman wondered why a
treaty was needed since neither Red Jacket nor the New
York State Legislature had actually petitioned for it. 7 New
York Congressman Henry Storrs' position eventually won.
Referring to the Trade and Intercourse Acts, Storrs
explained why a federal commissioner had to be appointed
and was required under law.98
On May 13, 1826, the House Committee on Indian
Affairs issued a report: "To Hold a Treaty with the Seneca
Indians."99 The report falsely claimed that the majority of
Senecas were "favorably disposed to the sale, or some parts
of their land."' 0 It added that the Senecas were desirous of
"civilization" since their lands "are mostly situated near
flourishing villages."'0 ' The report then concluded by
recommending the appointment of a federal Indian
commissioner to treat with the Senecas.' Oliver Forward
was the federal commissioner to treat with the Seneca
Indians at Buffalo Creek Reservation. Forward's first
priority was the shrinking of the Buffalo Creek Reservation,
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. 2 CONG. DEB. 1604-06 (1826).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1604.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See H.R. Rep. No. 209, 19th Cong. (1st Sess. 1826).
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not the securing of Genesee lands. °3 After all, the opening
of the Erie Canal a year earlier made Buffalo real estate
more attractive. The presence of a large Indian reservation
stretching from near the Buffalo waterfront eastward
twelve miles thwarted white efforts to expand the city.
14
Any chipping away of this landbase made Buffalo's
emergence as a major metropolitan area and Great Lakes
port more likely.'05 In contrast, Red Jacket, the great orator,
had his political base at Buffalo Creek. Although at times in
his illustrious career he reluctantly agreed to land cessions
(1797, 1802, 1815), none involved Buffalo Creek. The
reservation was not only the seat of Red Jacket's power, but
was also the ceremonial center of the post-Revolutionary
War Iroquois Confederacy. Hence, for Forward and Red
Jacket alike, but for two distinct reasons, Buffalo was the
Holy Grail.0 6 Nevertheless, the Genesee was the homeland
of the Seneca and had special meaning to the people.
Canawaugus, for example, was both the birthplace of
Handsome Lake and the Cornplanter.0 7 To the white
settlers, the Genesee Country was to be a major center of
agriculture, flour, timber and canal transportation from the
1820s to the Civil War.'08
On August 31, 1826, in a "treaty" held under the
authority of the United States at Buffalo Creek with Oliver
Forward, the chiefs and warriors of the Seneca Nation
reached agreement with the trustees for the Ogden Land
Company. John Greig represented Robert Troup, Thomas L.
Ogden and Benjamin W. Rogers. John Greig was the same
fellow who had secured much of the Gardeau Reservation in
the "treaty" of 1823.09 Nathaniel Gorham, a leading
speculator in Indian lands, was appointed, as he had been
in 1823, as a superintendent on behalf of the claims of the
State of Massachusetts under the terms of the December
16, 1786 Hartford agreement."0 Besides Forward, Phelps,
Greig and the Seneca representatives, six interpreters also
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Marvin Rapp, The Port Of Buffalo, 1825-1880, at 11-17 (1947)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file at Duke University).
106. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 66.
107. See id.
108. See NEiL ADAMS MCNALL, AN AGRiCULTURAL HISTORY OF THE GENESEE
VALLEY, 1790-1860 (1952).
109. See DOTY, supra note 53.
110. See WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8.
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attended the meeting. The interpreters included Horatio
Jones, who had served for over three decades in this
capacity, as well as Dr. Jacob Jemison, Mary Jemison's
grandson, a trained physician who had attended Dartmouth
College. Parrish, the Indian agent, was also in attendance.
Parrish had played various roles at treaty negotiations
since 1788, had close ties to Porter and was in the pay of
the Ogden Land Company."' At this "treaty," the Senecas
ceded all of their remaining Genesee Valley lands, including
Big Tree, Canawaugus, Squawky Hill, and the Gardeau
Reservation in Wyoming County, and the sixteen square
mile Caneadea Reservation. In addition, under the "treaty,"
the size of the Buffalo Creek, Tonawanda and Cattaraugus
Reservations was substantially reduced as well. Buffalo
Creek was reduced by 36,638 acres, Tonawanda by 33,409
acres, and Cattaraugus by 5120 acres.
Among the Seneca signatories to this "treaty" were
Young King, Pollard, Little Billy, Governor Blacksnake,
Captain Strong, Seneca White, White Seneca, Henry Two
Guns, Captain Shongo, Big Kettle and Red Jacket, many of
whom objected to the "treaty" but had distinct motives for
signing the agreement."' Some chiefs defined their interests
narrowly, namely to protect their individual reservations
and immediate interests, rather than fighting for the
sanctity of all of the Seneca lands." Despite his signature
on the "treaty," Red Jacket never truly supported the
"treaty' and led the opposition to it until his death in
1830. Red Jacket and his supporters questioned the legal
validity of the "treaty" of 1826. According to Henry S.
Manley, the former Assistant Attorney General of New
York State, United States Indian Commissioner Forward
received money from Troup, the Ogden Land Company
trustee, for unexplained expenses of the treaty."5 The
Ogden Land Company also had Dr. Jacob Jemison on its
payroll since the physician favored Indian land sales and
pushed for Seneca emigration to the West. Some of the
111. See William N. Fenton, Answers to Governor Cass' Questions by Jacob
Jameson, a Seneca [ca. 1821-18251, 16 ETHNOHISTORY 114-19 (1969) (describing
Dr. Jacob Jemison).
112. See WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
113. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 66.
114. See HENRY SAcKETT MANLEY, RED JACKET'S LAST CAMPAIGN 149-62
(1950).
115. See id.
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chiefs who signed this 1826 "treaty" were apparently
"bought off.""' On July 20, 1827, Forward defended the
practice: "[s]mall annuities may have been allowed the
principal chiefs, but the payment of such gratuities I believe
has been practiced under every treaty with Indian tribes of
this state since the organization of its government."" 7
As a result of Red Jacket's unbending opposition to the
"treaty," the pro-treaty group deposed him as a Seneca chief
on September 15, 1827. He was later reinstalled after a
public outcry against such action."' From the beginning,
Forward's actions came under fire. Consequently, on
January 30, 1827, he wrote President John Quincy Adams
to justify his actions."' Forward insisted that Red Jacket
opposed the sale "of any of the Indian lands from
commencement of negociations [sic]." 2 ° Forward added that
because of his attentiveness and the work of Jemison,
Gorham, Parrish and Jones, "no part of it [the "treaty"]
could have been misunderstood. Having been thus read,
explained and declared to be satisfactory, it was executed
by every one of the chiefs present." 2' Red Jacket was joined
by a "number of the Tonnewanta [Tonewanda Seneca]
Indians" whom Forward claimed were not chiefs.'22 Later in
his letter, Forward insisted that the anti-treaty forces at
the Buffalo Creek council were largely outnumbered and
were composed mainly of "a few of the indians [sic] who are
scattered over the small reservations upon the Genesee
River, and a part of the Tonnewantas [sic] .... " 2
On February 16, 1827, Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Thomas McKinney questioned whether Senate approval
was even necessary on Indian treaties since the 1826
"treaty" had a federal commissioner present. President
John Quincy Adams submitted the "treaty" to the Senate
"for their advice and consent" on February 24, 1827.124 On
May 19, 1827, Red Jacket and other prominent Senecas,
116. See id. at 150-56.
117. Id. at 153.
118. See id. at 155.
119. See Letter from Oliver Forward to the President of the United States
(January 30, 1827), microformed MSS., M234, MR 832, RG 75 (National
Archives).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 92, at 866.
124. Id. at 868.
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including many of the earlier signatories of the "treaty" of
1826, appealed directly to President John Quincy Adams.
Those who signed this memorial included leading
Tonawanda Senecas such as Jemmy Johnson and John
Blacksmith. In the memorial, these anti-treaty Senecas
insisted that "there are 2606 who are opposed to the sale of
their lands, while on the other hand it has been ascertained
that the number in favor are 430."' The memorial went on
to describe why Forward was appointed commissioner in
the first place. It claimed that Forward was merely
appointed "to save expenses of travel, he being at Buffalo
and could attend to it without much trouble, whereas great
expenses would be incurred by sending a man all the way
from the City of Washington."126 Forward only gave the
Senecas two days to decide on whether they would sell land.
The memorial further described how Red Jacket, fearing a
trick, took his own interpreter with him rather than relying
on Dr. Jemison whom he did not trust.' The chiefs also
decided to inform the Senecas on the other reservations
about what was sought by Forward. Greig, of the Ogden
Land Company, who arrived after Forward at the treaty
grounds, then "told Red Jacket that he would have the
land."28 Forward arose and informed the chiefs that it was
in their best interest to sell their land. He reasoned that the
Ogden land company would prefer them to refuse to sell so
they could employ the President of United States to drive
them off without having to pay them any money.129 Soon
after, Parrish added a threat of removal: "that if they did
not sell it would be a serious thing for them," since the
President had already appointed a set of commissioners "to
go to the west and look out a tract of land for them."3 °
The memorial also claimed that Red Jacket was offered
$260 to "compel" him to sell land while "other men of our
nation" were offered and received $100.131 Parrish and Jones
offered the "chief warrior" at Cattaraugus an annuity of
125. Memorial of Red Jacket and Seneca Chiefs and Principle Men to
President of the United States 8 (May 19, 1827) (on file with the Buffalo and
Erie County Historical Society).
126. Id. at 3.
127. See id. at 5.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 6.
131. See id. at 7.
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$100 per year, and Jones offered a similar amount to one of
the principal chiefs at Tonawanda, both of whom rejected
the overtures to sell Seneca lands. The memorial castigated
both Parrish and Jones, whom the Senecas had formerly
trusted, but who had become "fattened ... until their bellies
[hung] over their knees...,132 The Seneca memorial then
called for the dismissal of Parrish and Jones and the
appointment of future federal commissioners "living out of
our immediate vicinity."'33 It also sought Adams' support for
the retention of the Seneca lands lost in the "treaty" of
1826: 'Your red children feel determined not to release
their lands and possessions unless compelled to do so by our
father's power which we are unable to resist, but we have
every assurance that the hand of our father will not be
raised against a handful of his suffering Red children."13
On September 13, 1827, the pro-treaty group led by
Young King sent a memorial to President Adams defending
the actions of Forward, Parrish and Jones, insisting that
"there was no force, no threats, and no coercive language"
used by the federal commissioner, agent or interpreters.
They challenged Red Jacket's veracity as well as his mental
state. They claimed that Red Jacket purposely
overestimated the number of Indians "opposed to the late
treaty."'35 The memorial concluded:
We would now request our Father the President to ratify the said
Treaty, and to pay no further attention to the communication of
Red Jacket on the subject. Red Jacket is an old man, his mind is
broken, his memory is short, and he is devoid of truth. He is not,
and never has been the First Chief of our Tribe or our Nation.
Young King is and has been the first and Great Chief of the
Seneca Nation.
36
On December 28, 1827, Young King and his supporters
sent a second memorial to President Adams, now
explaining the "real" reasons why they put their names on
the "treaty" of 1826. They indicated that they had become
"surrounded" by a growing number of "white settlements"
and that Forward had suggested "that if we [the Seneca]
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 8.
134. See id.
135. Memorial from Young King to the President of the United States (Sept.
13, 1827), microformed MSS., M234, MR832, RG75 (National Archives).
136. Id.
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were more compact in our settlements, it would give greater
facility to our Father to attend to the wants of his red
children."'37 Greig, the attorney for the Ogden Land
Company, now pictured as the real enemy, informed the
Senecas that if they "would part with such a portion" of
their lands, the company "should forever after be left in
quietness upon that subject. For these reasons we parted
with a portion, with a fixed resolution to keep the
remainder for our posterity."3 '
On March 24, 1828, Red Jacket and two other Seneca
Indians were accompanied by the Secretary of War at an
audience with President John Quincy Adams at the White
House. The Indians insisted that their lands should "not be
taken away from them, nor they compelled to remove to
Green Bay.""9 They also urged President Adams to
immediately replace Parrish as their Indian agent because
they "charged him with having defrauded them of great
part of their annuity, of receiving money from their
adversaries [Ogden Land Company] and generally
disregarding the interest of those whom he was bound to
protect."' The Senecas also beseeched the President to
appoint a special emissary to "investigate these charges,
which they said, could easily be proved. "
The United States Senate took up debate on the
"treaty." On February 29, the Senate failed to ratify the
"treaty"by a vote of twenty to twenty.' John C. Calhoun,
the Vice President of the United States, did not even vote to
break the tie although treaties need two-thirds approval by
the Senate. Nor did Calhoun participate in the debate over
the treaty. Until April 4, 1828, the Senate also placed an
"injunction of secrecy" over deliberations over the "treaty" of
1826 with the Senecas. The Senate passed the following
ambiguous resolution:
That by the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty with the
Seneca Indians, it is not intended to express any disapprobation of
137. Id.
138. Memorial from Young King to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of War (Dec. 28, 1827), microformed MSS., M234, MR 808, RG75
(National Archives).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. JOHN QuINCy ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QuiNCY ADAMs VII, at 484-85
(1875) (Charles Francis Adams, ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875).
142. See 3 CONG. DEB. 601, 19th Cong. (1828).
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the terms of the contract entered into by individuals who are
parties to that contract, but merely to disclaim the necessity of an
interference by the Senate with the subject matter. 4
3
According to historian Francis Paul Prucha, the United
States Senate was "torn between two provisions" of the
federal Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802:
... one stipulated (following the act of 1790) that no purchase of
Indian land was valid "unless the same be made by treaty or
convention, entered into pursuant to the constitution," while the
other authorized state agents, with the approval of the United
States commissioners, to be present at an Indian treaty council
and to deal with the Indians rega4ding compensation for claims to
land extinguished by the 
treaty.
Prucha's contention does not appear to legitimize the
so-called "treaty" of 1826 since all treaties, to be treaties,
must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the United States
Senate. Prucha's contention is naive because it suggests
that the senators simply had a different interpretation of
this "treaty." Vice President Calhoun, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs McKenney and the new Secretary of War,
Porter, were all clearly avoiding their federal trust
responsibilities in protecting the Seneca interests.
Embarrassed by the revelations of fraud under the treaty
and by Red Jacket's effective campaign to publicize the
fraud, Senate action on the "treaty" came to a halt.
To his credit, the President followed through with Red
Jacket's request. On May 9, 1828, because of growing
Indian and Quaker protest against the validity of the 1826
"treaty," the Secretary of War appointed Richard
Montgomery Livingston of Saratoga, New York to
investigate the events surrounding the 1826 "treaty."
14
Livingston's report is both revealing and disturbing. The
report was ironically sent on December 28, 1828 to Peter B.
Porter, the newly-appointed Secretary of War. It clearly
delineates the fraud perpetrated at the "treaty." Livingston
maintained that, until August of 1826, the Seneca chiefs
"disputed about religion but clung to the common object of
retaining their lands." "14 At no time since the founding of
143. Id. at 603.
144. PRUCHA, supra note 88, at 144-45.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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the Ogden Land Company in 1810 until ten days after the
council of 1826 had been in session "were any of the chiefs,
willing to convey any of their lands.""7 The investigator
then explained what had transpired to get Seneca
"approval."4 8
Livingston indicated that immediately after the War of
1812, the Ogdens gave $5000 each to the Government
Agent and interpreter and one other interpreter in order to
"influence" the Seneca to extinguish their title. "The Agents
[probably meaning Parrish and Jones] thus retained were
empowered to enlist in the service, by liberal ... stipends
for life, such as the chiefs as might be won."49 Until 1826,
these efforts failed. The appointment of Forward to push a
land transaction was done "without the solicitation or
privity of the tribe." Forward then convened a council on
August 11, 1826, employing arguments "addressed to the
hopes and fears of the nation," implying that removal to the
West was the only other option.' "The terrors of a removal
enchained their minds in duress," leading them to submit
"to sell a part to preserve the residue." 5'
Livingston suggested several other ways Forward
gained approval. He claimed that the Ogden Land Company
proprietors and Forward had a secret rendezvous at
Rochester prior to the council in which they perfected their
strategy. Dr. Jacob Jemison, described by Livingston as a
"civilized native," was "retained by the Proprietors."'52 He
and five others were hired as interpreters, but served the
interests of the Ogden Land Company first and foremost.
Livingston also pointed a finger at many of the chiefs,
especially the Christian faction who resided around the
Seneca Mission at Buffalo Creek, who had become
dependent on federal annuities and other "rewards."
153
Thus, largely because of the negative findings
expressed in the Livingston Report, the "treaty" of 1826 was
never resubmitted to the United States Senate for its advice
147. See id.
148. See Report from Richard Montgomery Livingston to Peter B. Porter,
Secretary of War (Dec. 25, 1828), microformed MSS., M234, MR808, RG75
(National Archives).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 8.
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and consent. Red Jacket was politically rehabilitated as a
result of the overwhelming support by reservation residents
for Red Jacket's anti-treaty stance in 1826 and the
recantations by almost all of the chiefs who had agreed to
the massive land sale. However, with the aged chiefs death
in 1830, Seneca resolve weakened and new fissures in the
tribal polity erupted. By that time, the Senecas faced off
against new threats largely aided by a national policy of
forced Indian removal to the west, articulated by Andrew
Jackson and his Vice President, Martin Van Buren, a New
Yorker.
CONCLUSION
The Treaties of 1823 and 1826, although fraudulent at
their roots, were allowed to stand. The legal obstacles to
Indian land suits at the time made it almost impossible to
obtain redress until monetary compensation was awarded
the Senecas under the Indian Claims Commission in the
late 1960s and early 1970s.' In the meantime, Genesee
Country became white man's territory, with rapid
settlement before the Civil War. Livingston County, formed
from Genesee and Ontario Counties in 1821, had a
population of 35,140 by 1840.' Despite its split into several
separate counties, Genesee County's population rose from
12,588 to 59,587 from 1810 to 1840.156 Wyoming County was
formed from Genesee in 1841, while Allegany County, in its
present form, was established in 1856 after a series of
annexations and cessions of land from 1806 onward."7 From
the summary of events that transpired in the 1820s
regarding Seneca lands, it is clear that Justice Andrews
and the Court of Appeals in Seneca Nation v. Christy
invented history in the 1891 decision. Because the 1826
treaty did not receive the required vote for confirmation
from the United States Senate, it could never have been
passed after Richard Montgomery Livingston's scathing
report. Hence, Andrews concocted a legal argument that the
treaty never had to be ratified in the first place since the
154. See generally 28 Ind. C1. Comm. 12.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS (1810); J.H.
FRENCH, GAZETTEER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 168-77, 320-28, 380-87, 710-21
(1860); WHITFORD, supra note 81, at 914-19.
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Hartford Convention of 1786, a federally-ratified accord,
had allowed for the 1826 "sale" with or without United
States Senate approval. Furthermore, in the eyes of Justice
Andrews and other judges, the Senecas made no timely
effort to seek redress. Justice Andrews attempted to bolster
his argument by insisting that since some public monies
had eventually been deposited in trust for the benefit of the
Senecas in the mid 1850s, this somehow retroactively
confirmed Seneca acquiescence to the 1826 "deal." At the
time of the so-called "closing" of the frontier, four months
after the Wounded Knee Massacre, chapters in the history
of earlier frontiers had to be rewritten by the courts. Courts
tried to excuse the actions of great statesmen who had
contributed so much to the rise of the Empire State and
with it to the fall of the Iroquois Indians. One year later,
the ninety-nine year lease to Salamanca went into effect,
with the Senecas receiving a pittance under the provisions
of this act. The implications were clear, namely that a
vanishing, "antiquated" race had to give way to American
progress symbolized by the railroad yards in the white city
arising on the Allegany Indian Reservation. Transactions in
New York State were parallel to those occurring to
American Indians throughout the nation. Furthermore, the
same United States Supreme Court that insisted no federal
issues were involved in the Christy case, decided seven
years later the abominable Lonewolf v. Hitchcock.5 ' Indeed,
Lonewolf allowed for the unilateral abrogation of a federal-
Indian treaty by Congress under the conveniently invented
Doctrine of Plenary Power.
158. 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903).
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